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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By
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R.

BATES

A.B., University of Denver, 1940; LL.B., Westminster Law School, 1943;
member of firm of Yegge, Bates, Hall and Shulenburg; member of
Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations.

Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court which became final
in the period November 1, 1955 to January 1, 1957 are covered by
this review. Only one case was one of first impression under Colorado law, in which the Supreme Court considered a conflict of
authority and adopted the majority rule. In all the other cases, the
court applied principles already established in Colorado tort law.
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM BLASTING

In the case of Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman,1 the
court adopted the rule of liability without negligence for damage
resulting from blasting operations. The defendant corporation, a
land blasting company, employed a company to level building sites.
Rocks in the land had to be removed by blasting. At the instance of
defendant, the levelling contractor employed another person to do
the blasting with dynamite, and the operations were conducted
under the direct supervision of the defendant's president. A heavy
blast deposited rocks on the roof of the plaintiff's property, damaging the roof, and vibration and concussion from the blast caused
additional damage to the building and contents. Defendant contended that it was not liable for damage caused by vibration and
concussion unless the blasting was negligently done. The Supreme
Court rejected that contention and followed what is stated to be
the majority rule: One who uses blasting material likely to cause
damage to adjoining property is liable if damage to such adjoining
property results, whether from direct impact of rocks thrown out
by the explosion, or from concussion or vibration, and it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to allege or prove negligence to recover
for any damage resulting from this inherently dangerous operation.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY AND DAMAGE FROM INFLAMMABLES

In Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Golden Gas Co.,2 the court
imposed on a dispenser of propane gas the duty to use a high degree
of care commensurate with its dangerous character. Defendant's
employee brought the propane gas to a farm residence in a tank
truck and was transferring the propane from the truck to a storage
tank through a hose. The hose came loose from the storage tank,
apparently because of a defective coupling on the storage tank. The
flow of propane was not entirely cut off. The free end of the hose
whipped around, spraying the house, garage and ground with liquid
propane. An explosion occurred within less than a minute. The
evidence showed that the fire could have been started by any one
or more of three causes: The exhaust from defendant's truck, a
burning pilot light on the line from the storage tank to the house
or the nozzle of the hose striking rocks. The driver had diverted his
1 133
2

Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
133 Colo. 537, 298 P.2d 950 (1956).
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attention to look at something else after he had coupled the hose.
He had not inspected the truck before making the delivery nor
checked to see if the pilot flame was on. The flow of gas was not
automatically cut off when the hose broke. The high court held
that all of these matters showed failure to use the degree of care
required in the handling of propane gas.
In the case of Burley v. MacDowell5 a nine-year-old boy was
denied recovery for injuries sustained in an explosion of gasoline.
Plaintiff was the guest of defendants' child. The boys got the gas
from an outbuilding which they had been forbidden to enter and
brought it into the defendant's residence to use as "fuel" to run
a toy boat motivated by a lighted candle which the boys had been
sailing in the bath tub. The plaintiff testified that he knew the
mixture would burn, and he did not tell defendants he was going
to get it because he knew he was not supposed to go into the building where it was kept. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
for the defendants, pointing out that the situation was different
from a case in which inflammable and explosive gasoline was kept
in large quantities at a place frequented by children. It was kept
separate and apart in a place where the children had been forbidden to go and there was no reason for the defendants to foresee
that the plaintiff would do what he did.
AUTOMOBILE GUEST LAW

In the case of Burrell v. Anderson,' the court again considered
the question whether the evidence in a suit brought by a guest
passenger against his host disclosed anything more than simple
negligence as the cause of the accident. Reviewing the evidence
the court concluded that it disclosed, at most, simple negligence on
the part of the host, of which the plaintiff guest assumed the risk.
Defendant's conduct was the result of a passive mind and not the
result of active and purposeful intent; not conscious, voluntary,
wilful or wanton.
Warner v. Barnard, was a suit by a guest passenger against the
host driver in which the plaintiff alleged that the accident was
caused by the defendant's intoxication and negligence consisting
* 133 Colo. 566, 298 P.2d 399 (1956).
* 133 Colo. 386, 295 P.2d 1039 (1956).
5 304 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1956).
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of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others. On appeal
from a judgment for the defendant on a jury verdict, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because of
an erroneous instruction on the issues of liability and because of
error in admitting evidence concerning the damages sustained by
the defendant and his wife for which no claim was made in the suit.
The instruction (to which neither party had objected) told the jury
in substance that if they found that it was equally probable that
the accident was caused by the defendant's simple negligence, his
intoxication or his wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of
others, or by an unavoidable accident, their verdict must be for
the defendant. The court indicated that the instruction might be
clear to a lawyer, but could only be confusing to a jury of laymen
and was clearly erroneous.
DUTY TO BUSINESS INVITEE

In the case of Webb v. Thomas,' the court stated the rule governing imposition of liability on the possessor of land for injury
to a business patron. To impose liability, two elements must be
present: 1) a realization that the condition constitutes an unreasonable risk to the patron and 2) the absence of any reason to believe
that the condition will be discovered by the patron or the risk
realized by him. The defendant was the proprietor of a swimming
pool. He had spent time and money studying swimming pools, had
employed the services of a well known swimming pool company to
build the pool and at the time of trial more than 12,000 persons had
used the pool without injury. At about ten o'clock at night the
plaintiff, who had had a few drinks, dove into the water at the
shallow end of the pool and was seriously injured. The water was
three and a half feet deep at that end, and eight and a half feet
deep at the other end. The water was clear and well lighted. The
only diving board was at the deep end. However, there were no
signs showing the depth of the water. The court held that there
was no negligence on the part of the defendant and he could not
reasonably have foreseen that the plaintiff would attempt to dive
into the shallow water.
In the case of Brent v. Bank of Aurora7 the Supreme Court
sustained a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendant in a
case in which the plaintiff, a customer of the defendant bank,
slipped on ice in the bank's parking lot. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the ice had been there
long enough and was of such a dangerous character that the bank,
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered and
remedied the condition. In fact, there was no evidence as to when
or how the ice got there and no evidence that anyone, even the
plaintiff, saw the ice before the accident.
INNKEEPER's LIABILITY

In Lombardy v. Stees8 a judgment against an innkeeper was
reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss the complaint of
a guest who was assaulted by the defendant's bartender. The court
6 133
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8 132 Colo. 570, 290 P.2d 1110 (1955).
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said that the evidence clearly showed that the only instructions the
defendant had given the bartender were to serve drinks and to
refuse any patron who had had too much. It was clear that the
blow was motivated by a personal insult which the bartender had
received from the plaintiff. The injury was done during the bartender's employment, but not within the scope of his employment,
and for this act of his servant, without his authority, the innkeeper
was not liable.
But another innkeeper's employee subjected his master to
liability by conduct outside the scope and course of his employment
in the case of Bidlake v. Shirley Co.' In this case a guest drove his
car up to the front door of the defendant's hotel and was met by
the defendant's uniformed night porter, who asked the plaintiff
if he wanted the car stored. The plaintiff answered affirmatively
and gave the car keys to the porter, who gave him a claim check.
The procedure authorized by the employer was for the porter to
call a nearby garage, which would send an employee to pick up
the car. Instead of doing that the porter drove the car away on a
"joy ride." The next day, the plaintiff found his car parked on the
street in a damaged condition with valuable personal property
missing from it. The court held that under these circumstances the
plaintiff had a right to assume that the porter had authority to take
possession of the car. The court quoted the statute which provides:
"The landlord or keeper of any hotel or public inn shall not be
liable for loss of or damage to the property of any guest or
patron of such hotel or public inn by fire or by any unforeseen
causes or by inevitable accident, unless such loss of or damage
shall occur on account of his negligence or the negligence of
his servants or employees."'10
The high court cited decisions of other states holding innkeepers
liable in similar fact situations and concluded that under the
evidence the trial court erred in entering judgment for the defendant.
LIABILITY OF CITY AND ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER FOR INJURY TO
PEDESTRIAN FALLING ON CITY-OWNED PARKWAY

In Aikens v. Clayton Trust," the Supreme Court held that
"Plaintiff's own testimony doomed her right of recovery, leaving
12
no other course for the trial court than to dismiss the complaint."'
Plaintiff got off a bus at a corner with which she was thoroughly
familiar, started to walk across the "parkway" to the sidewalk,
stepped into a hole in the parkway she knew about and always
tried to avoid, could not step high enough when she tried to step
out of the hole, stubbed her toe, fell all the way across the sidewalk
and onto a low guard railing on the corner of the private property
abutting the sidewalk. She sued the owner of this property and
the city. The city claim was dismissed because of the plaintiff's
failure to give the city notice of the accident within the time required by the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the guard
- 133 Colo. 166, 292 P.2d 749 (1956).
'0Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 68-1-11 (1953).
uz132 Colo. 374, 288 P.2d 349 (1955).
" 132 Colo. at 378, 288 P.2d at 351.
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rail was not a dangerous obstruction and there was no negligence
in installing it where it was. There was nothing to show that
anything the defendants did or did not do.was a proximate cause
of the accident. By way of dictum the court indicated that even
if the city had not been dismissed because notice was not givenit would not be liable, because the parkway was not a part of the
sidewalk that should be maintained in a safe condition for pedestrian use, and the degree of care relative to the parkway area
is of a lower standard than that required in the construction and
maintenance of sidewalks.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY

In a common law action against his employer, the plaintiff in
the case of Perry v. Ruybal'3 failed to prove any negligence on the
part of the employer as the cause of his injury. The evidence tended
to show that his own misstep caused his accident, and proved
nothing beyond the mere happening of the accident.
LIBEL AND SLANDER

In Brown v. Barnes," an action for libel and slander, the plaintiff alleged that his reputation had been injured and that he had
lost an election in which he was running for re-election as sheriff
because the defendant had said: "The sheriff [plaintiff] has accumulated property of the value of $80,000. A person cannot accumulate that much money on a $425.00 salary in a period of 4
years."5
The plaintiff contended that the innuendo of these words was that
he had accumulated property by embezzlement and other dishonesty in office. However, he produced no evidence that anyone had
refused to vote for him on account of such statements. He proved
that he had acquired the property during his term of office through
his own work in the real estate business. The defendant pleaded
the truth of the statement as a defense and contended that the
statement was not slanderous per se and did not carry the innuendo
contended for. The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's contention and pointed out that the alleged statement was susceptible
of another meaning-that the plaintiff's preoccupation with his real
13133
14 133
2s133

Colo. 502, 297 P.2d 531 (1956).
Colo. 411, 296 P.2d 739 (1956).
Colo. at 412; 296 P.2d at 740.
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estate business precluded adequate performance of his duties as
sheriff. The court also held that there was no proof that the making
of the statement caused the loss of the election.
NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW
IN AUTOMOBILE CASES

In a number of cases, the court wrestled with the question
whether a party's conduct was negligence or contributory negligence or not negligence as a matter of law. Whether or not these
opinions disclose a departure from the basic principle that issues
of negligence are questions of fact probably cannot be determined
at this time.
In one rural intersection accident case, the court upheld the
trial court's finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, and in another case arising out of an accident at
the same kind of intersection (except that it was more obstructed)
the court held that the trial court had erred in finding that a driver,
killed in the accident, was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law.
In the first-mentioned case, Bennett v. Hall,16

"...

plaintiff was

traveling on a preferred thoroughfare at a speed under the allowable limit in the proper lane and having the right of way."' 7 He
first saw the defendant's car when he (plaintiff) was five or six
hundred feet from the intersection, at which time the defendant
was forty-five feet from the intersection. He kept on watching the
defendant, and wondered what the defendant was going to do.
When he was three hundred feet from the intersection, traveling
fifty miles an hour, he lightly touched the brake and slowed to
forty, and when a hundred and twenty-fiv6 feet from the intersection slammed on the brake and turned to the right but was unable
to avoid hitting the defendant's car. The court held that there
was no doubt that the defendant was negligent, but the plaintiff's
right of way did not relieve him of the duty to use reasonable
care to avoid an accident.
"Plaintiff failed to have his car sufficiently under control to
avoid striking the defendant's car. Plaintiff's failure to guard
against the possibility of the eventuality concerning which he
expressed apprehension certainly furnishes ample ground for a
conclusion that he was contributorily negligent."' 8
In the second case, Rigot v. Conda,10 an action by the deceased
driver's personal representative and children, the accident occurred
at a more or less "blind" intersection. The decedent was traveling
on what was posted as a through highway, but at this intersection
the stop sign had been removed. Just before the accident he waved
at a passing driver, and waved at a friend sitting on a porch nearby.
The court said that the facts were entirely different from those of
the Bennett case, in that there was no evidence in the Rigot case
the decendent saw the defendant's truck as it approached the
132
132
38 132
19304
16
17

Colo. 419, 290 P.2d 241 (1955).
Colo. at 423, 290 P.2d at 243.
Colo. at 425, 290 P.2d at 244.
P.2d 629 (Colo. 1956).
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highway, and it cannot be said that waving at others was contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In several cases the court held that there was no evidence of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff sufficient to
justify the giving of a jury instruction on the doctrine. The plaintiff
in the Sherry case,20 a thirteen year old girl, was attempting to
cross West 8th Avenue at Lipan Street in Denver, from the southwest to the northwest corner of the intersection. There were no
signal lights. Before stepping into the street she stopped to wait
for traffic. A truck going east in the south lane of traffic stopped
near the crosswalk, and other automobiles traveling east in the
south lane halted behind the truck. The truck driver motioned the
plaintiff to cross. Plaintiff walked in the crosswalk in front of the
truck and was struck by the defendant's car, traveling east in the
north lane of traffic, passing the line of stopped automobiles at a
speed of about twenty-five miles an hour. A city ordinance prohibited passing a vehicle stopped at a crosswalk to permit a pedestrian to cross. The Supreme Court held, reversing a jury verdict
for the defendant, that if the plaintiff saw the defendant's car coming she had a right to assume the defendant would stop, and that
giving an instruction on contributory negligence, in the absence of
any testimony, was error, because the jury would have inferred
that the court believed there was evidence of contributory negligence.
0

' Sherry v. Jones, 133 Colo. 160, 292 P.2d 746 (1956).
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The plaintiffs in the Ridenour case2 ' were two women who
were struck by the defendant's car while walking east across Broadway in Denver, in a crosswalk, at 12:30 A. M., with a green light.
The defendant, traveling west with the green light, made a left turn
to go south on Broadway and did not see the plaintiffs until he was
about twelve feet from them. He was not traveling at an excessive
rate of speed, but was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting
the plaintiffs after he saw them. The plaintiffs testified that they
looked before crossing the street, and noticed only one car, not the
defendant's, and did not see defendant's car before it hit them.
A city ordinance required the driver to yield the right of way to
pedestrians lawfully within the intersection. The Supreme Court
held that the failure of the plaintiffs to see the defendant's car
was not contributory negligence: "It is obvious they didn't see
defendant's vehicle when they lawfully started to cross the street
because it was not yet in the intersection. 2 2 The court reversed
a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
In the Stephens case,2 3 the plaintiff, traveling on his own side
of the road, was struck by the defendant's car coming from the
opposite direction. Defendant's explanation was that he lost control on the icy pavement when he had to turn sharply to the left
to miss a car which had cut in front of him. The court approved
the giving of an unavoidable accident instruction, but reversed
a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that it was error to give
an instruction on contributory negligence.
24
the Supreme Court held that it
In Brakhahn v. Hildebrand
cattle on a highway at night with
of
was negligence to move a herd
no one in attendance except a man on horseback and another man
in a jeep, the headlights of which faced oncoming cars. The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which struck the cattle. The
court held that the jury should not have been instructed on contributory negligence, as there was no evidence upon which any
negligence on the part of the driver of the car plaintiff was riding
in could be imputed to plaintiff, and indicated that the defendant's
negligence was negligence as a matter of law.
" Ridenour v. Diffee, 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956).
SId. at 471, 297 P.2d at 282.
2Stephens . Lung, 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
301 P.2d 347 (Colo. 1956).
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